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Abstract
The banking sector had long been left at the fringes of China's reform poli-
cies. Major initiatives of the 1990 and early 2000s helped to balance the need 
for modernization and internationalization with the objective of preserving 
political control. When the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) erupted in 2007, it 
hit the Chinese economy but predominantly in its export sector and much 
less in its ﬁnancial sector. Yet when exports collapsed and factories closed in 
the winter of 2008/2009, the Chinese leadership implemented an ambitious 
stimulus program and used its leverage over the ﬁnancial sector to re-start 
economic growth. These factors – GFC and domestic stimulus – created a 
series of intended and unintended outcomes. Financial reform in China en-
tered a new stage signalling a profound change in China's banking sector. 
These changes follow two sometimes contradictive, sometimes mutually re-
inforcing reform dynamics of top-down policies and bottom-up innovation. 
In this article we follow an institutional approach and discuss the intensiﬁed 
participation of China's big banks in the Go Out strategy, followed by a shift 
in the pattern of lending. One factor in this change is the rise of shadow bank-
ing and particularly an explosive growth in internet-based ﬁnancial services. 
Thus, while the initial reaction to the GFC re-emphasized direct, top-down 
state involvement in the banking sector, the outcomes of the GFC, China's poli-
cies and business innovations have facilitated profound bottom-up changes.
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Introduction
More than thirty years since the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) approved the policies 
of reform and opening up in 1978, the Socialist Market Economy of the 
People's Republic of China (henceforth China or PRC) faced one of its 
most crucial challenges: the ﬁnancial crisis which erupted in the United 
States in 2007 transformed China's international environment henceforth 
so conducive for its modernization. The crisis sent shockwaves from the 
US sub-prime mortgage sector into the ﬁnancial, economic, social and 
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political realms of practically all advanced and emerging economies. 
China experienced a sharp decline in exports and economic activity in the 
winter of 2008/2009. Its banks, insurance companies and large industrial 
enterprises, however, seemed to master the external shock astonishingly 
well, as shown in their proﬁt margin increases and expanding balance 
sheets. The institutional framework for China's ﬁnancial service sector 
proved resilient. A massive economic stimulus programme rekindled 
economic growth. As a by-product, however, disintermediation and 
rapid credit growth threatened ﬁnancial stability. The crisis had caught 
China's ﬁnancial sector in the middle of a reform drive, which had to be 
taken to a new stage of intensiﬁed internationalisation, marketization 
and diversiﬁcation (Zhou Xiaochuan 2015).1 Regulatory reform and deep 
changes in China's banking sector went high up the political agenda 
in spite of its threats to a Leninist party-state safeguarding ﬁnance as a 
central pillar of its political power.
In studies of regulatory reform, crises are often interpreted as critical 
junctions that stimulate departure from path-dependent evolution of 
rules, norms and codes of conduct in the form of innovative reforms 
(Kroszner, Randall & Strahan 2000). They affect a multi-facetted process 
of change in reaction to the crisis conducted by 'a multitude of heteroge-
neous actors operating in a multitude of different sites' (Mayntz 2012: 12). 
Looking at the recent history of the Chinese party-state in rebuilding its 
ﬁnancial services sector, this link between global crises and institutional 
innovation deserves further study. While earlier works have emphasized 
the signiﬁcance of the party-state in the politics of regulatory reform in 
China's ﬁnancial services sector, we propose a slightly different perspec-
tive: in the tradition of an actor-centred historical institutionalism (Farrell 
& Newman 2010; Mayntz 2012; Mayntz & Scharpf 1996) we analyze the 
changes in China's banking sector as politics of regulation resulting from 
a political and entrepreneurial reaction to changes in the political and 
business environment at the national, local, and global level.
The politics of regulation in China's ﬁnancial sector are typiﬁed by 
the combination of a Leninist party-state with regulatory mechanisms in 
an East Asian developmentalist setting (Heilmann 2005, 2011; Pearson 
2007, 2011), aptly characterized as a case of 'ﬁnancial repression' (Heep 
2017: 213). Thus, regulation in China is confronted with two conﬂict-
ing objectives: allowing greater liberalization promoted by regulatory 
agencies to provide a rule-based structure for economic activity in 
accordance with international expectations, norms and rules; and to 
enhance control and mechanisms for direct intervention by the party-
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state. While China has established a series of regulatory commissions 
and other specialized bodies for ﬁnancial services regulation since the 
late 1990s, these organizations are part of the hierarchy of the party-
state. In China, political organs overrule regulatory bodies when this is 
deemed necessary to support the objectives of the (central) state or the 
CCP. Their members are cadres, whose careers are centrally planned and 
supervised. The party-state, however, rarely acts as a unitary actor. Es-
sentially, strategic industries, of which banking is one, suffer from poorly 
demarcated regulatory inﬂuence from state-level planning bodies, such 
as the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
of the State Council (SASAC) or the PRC National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), and the industry-speciﬁc regulators China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) and China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
(CIRC) (Gottwald & Collins 2012; Martin 2012).2 
A strict hierarchy based on Leninist party-state structures is con-
fronted with complex rivalries and processes of negotiation among 
different groups of actors. In a seminal work Shih (2007) pointed to the 
existence of two rival factions, technocrats and generalists, that inﬂuence 
the supply of credit, whereby the generalists support economic growth 
by means of credit extension and the technocrats develop policies that 
limit resulting inﬂation and bubble risk. This has a signiﬁcant effect on 
both the overall path of institutional change and the reaction to external 
shocks such as crises.
This article will focus on the developments in the ﬁnancial sector 
in China immediately after the 2008 GFC. This sector of the economy 
exhibits a variegated development: on the one hand, there was a re-
trenchment towards greater state control, with the state giving guid-
ance on the direction and magnitude of credit growth and pushing the 
state-controlled banks to increase lending. On the other hand, a new set 
of reforms of the ﬁnancial sector were introduced in order to support 
a structural shift to a greater reliance on domestic consumption, foster 
a more entrepreneurial culture, and provide better access to formal 
ﬁnancing for the SME segment and private companies. This was ac-
companied by an implicitly acknowledged wave of ﬁnancial innovation 
at the local level.
Thus, the ﬁnancial sector was at the heart of China's policy response 
to the GFC. It underwent signiﬁcant change, moving from an emphasis 
on bank lending (heavily biased to SOEs) to a more dynamic sector that 
managed to escape regulatory reins at times. In this period, Chinese 
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banks grew to become some of the largest in the world, supported by 
a loose monetary policy and the continuation of ﬁnancial repression 
(Lardy 2008;3 Subacchi 2017: 49-67). Shadow banking developed quickly, 
with the implicit support of the central authorities triggering a process 
of dynamic innovation outside the regulatory framework. Through 
their enormous proﬁtability, bolstered by a secured high net interest 
margin, banks were able to support their capital base and conﬁdently 
look to the future of increased regulatory requirements that followed 
the implementation of the Basel II rules in China. But the lending spree 
following the GFC led to an on-going demand for more credit. This 
intensiﬁed the competition for deposits resulting from earlier hesitant 
moves to liberalize interest rates as a means of modernization. Various 
reform initiatives were announced, some of them tested, few imple-
mented (Andreosso-O'Callaghan & Gottwald 2013), and most increas-
ingly linked with the liberalization of the RMB and its incorporation 
into the Special Drawing Rights of the IMF (Prasad 2016: 141-149). 
China's new role in global ﬁnance stepped up the pressures resulting 
from international politics on the domestic reform drive (Wen Jiabao 
2010;4 Dai Xianglong 2011).5
The banking sector in China saw an impetus for four distinct trends 
following the GFC: 1) increased orientation towards foreign markets as 
part of a re-emphasized national policy, the 'Go Global Strategy' also 
supporting the internationalisation of the RMB; 2) a signiﬁcant shift in 
the patterns of credit provision which is closely linked with; 3) ﬁnancial 
disintermediation and; 4) the rise of shadow banking. Shadow banking 
became a hotbed for innovative practices by fostering China's explosive 
growth in e-commerce for the development of new ﬁnancial products 
and services (internet ﬁnance). These developments all contributed to 
a structural shift in access to formal and informal ﬁnancing between 
sectors and forms of ownership.
China's Institutional Change as Regulatory Politics 
between Domestic Demands and External Pressures 
Throughout the reform period, the policies of market creation adopted 
by the leadership of the CPC were aimed at preserving its dominant 
position in Chinese politics. Research on China's economic policies has 
been dominated by institutional analysis following a top-down logic 
of centrally initiated reforms or a bottom-up perspective of entrepre-
neurial activities, ﬁrst ignored and later acknowledged by the state (Nee 
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& Opper 2013). The interplay of top-down and bottom-up initiatives 
generated a new form of governance. The policy process allowed for 
extensive experimentalism under the 'shadow of hierarchy' (Heilmann 
2008) where the central leadership could encourage local actors to test 
new policies relying on the party-state for revision or ex-post legitimi-
zation. The politics of market creation, control and regulatory reforms 
followed a similar pattern of actors reacting to incentives provided by 
an institutional framework, which they actively sought to inﬂuence 
(Levy-Faur 2012a, 2012b; Mayntz 2012). 'Markets' in this context are 
institutions setting incentives for actors to pursue their interests (Wil-
liamson 1982; North 1991), including the will to introduce institutional 
change (Mayntz & Scharpf 1998). Institutions are thus the product of 
actions, are embedded in speciﬁc sociocultural contexts, and require 
consistent supervision, preservation, attention and innovation. Due to 
the speciﬁc nature of ﬁnancial markets, the politics of ﬁnancial regulation 
involve an on-going race between regulators and regulates, powerful 
external actors pursuing their interests and the high volatility of mas-
sive capital ﬂows (Gottwald 2012). Thus, while regulatory reforms can 
successfully be modelled as a process of institutional change, this can 
be drastic and triggered by both changes in domestic constellations and 
external shocks (Mayntz 2012). 
In China, the policies of market creation in the ﬁnancial sector did 
not follow the logic of creating an optimum framework for a maturing 
market economy. Rather, they sought ways to get the best out of two 
realities: the control of a key sector of the economy by a Leninist party-
state, and open access for foreign and domestic capital into Chinese 
business (Heilmann 2005; Collins & Gottwald 2014). On an individual 
level, this allowed leading representatives of the party-state to pursue 
business opportunities. On a collective level, it prepared the ground for 
a much more efﬁcient and comprehensive utilization of Chinese and 
foreign savings for the unqualiﬁed pursuit of economic growth. Reform 
of the ﬁnancial sector was closely tied to the reform of the state-owned 
enterprise system and deferred to a relatively late moment in China's 
process of opening up (Subacchi 2017: 29-48). Once it was approached 
with remarkable stamina by the Zhu Rongji government in the late 
1990s, it followed the fundamental path of attempting to outgrow its 
inefﬁciencies and structural problems (Huang et al. 2005). 
China's response to external ﬁnancial crises thus included the ele-
ments of a top-down regulatory change, i.e. the introduction of new 
policies and institutions, as well as bottom-up processes of adapting to 
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the new framework and its inherent incentive structures. The speciﬁc 
context for China's banking industry is constituted by formal and infor-
mal institutions, including the networks that make up Chinese politics. 
Unanticipated consequences come in the form of the macro-economic 
and ﬁnancial repercussions of previous economic policy, coupled with 
the outcome of external events and developments. Yet the resulting 
path-dependency is threatened and potentially disrupted by crises. As 
Gourevitch (1978) pointed out, severe economic crises lead to a destruc-
tion of existing economic equilibriums, necessitating new paradigms 
and thereby opening up for learning and new ideas. A clear example 
in the context of this article is the rise of ﬁnancial disintermediation, or 
shadow banking (see below). 
While China's regulatory responses to the GFC has been the subject of 
several studies (Herd et al. 2010; Huang 2010; Walter & Fraser 2011), the 
impact on China's banking industry, particularly the massive push for 
innovation and competition as an unintended consequence of an external 
shock – the GFC – and its economic policy response – the 2008 stimulus 
programme – deserves our attention. The GFC increased the pressure on 
the Chinese government to further improve its macro-economic control. 
Both, GFC and macro-economic control challenged the structure and 
behavioural patterns of China's banking system, leading to calls for 
further improvement of the regulatory framework.6 As Yu Yongding 
noted in 2010, the 'current crisis also presents a good opportunity to 
speed up reforms' – including ﬁnance and the further liberalization of 
the control of the interest rates and the exchange rate (2010: 21).
The crisis provided a convincing suggestion that the 'old' model of 
the export-driven economy provided a risk in times of external crises7 
and expedited the need for domestic reform; this structural reform could 
only be achieved by a supportive banking sector that would change its 
path-dependent lending pattern of favouring ailing SOEs and implic-
itly accept the rise of new forms of enterprise ﬁnancing. Therefore, this 
article is focused on the latter.  
The GFC, China's Response and its Effects on China's 
Banking Sector
In the years prior to 2007, China's economy had made a giant step. The 
Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997 triggered decisive reforms by the Chinese 
government (Yang 2010).8 The WTO entry marked the start of a period 
of tremendous increases in the PRC's external trade, unleashing pro-
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tracted double-digit GDP growth. This ﬁlled the coffers of the Ministry of 
Finance with external reserves and propped up the sovereign's balance 
sheet enough to ﬁnance another round of recapitalization of China's larg-
est banks. So when the GFC broke out, Chinese banks were in a relatively 
healthy state, with low NPL ratios and, due to the insulated nature of 
China's banking sector, this situation did not change much . Income was 
sound and stable as a result of continued ﬁnancial repression through 
regulated interest rates. However, the structural and comparative lack 
of fee income underlined the overall lack of breadth of China's ﬁnancial 
markets. Financing was still predominantly bank ﬁnancing, and banks 
continued to foster lending in support of the ﬁxed asset investment-led 
growth model. Exports grew in absolute size, but as a share of GDP, 
the contribution remained largely constant. To avoid instability from 
overly rapid reform, yet to activate the growth potential of ﬁnancial in-
novation, China's leadership decided to continue on a cautious reform 
path. This entailed the introduction of ambitious objectives followed 
by careful, smaller reform initiatives 'with more caution and a renewed 
emphasis on the role of the state as owner of strategic facilities, provider 
of social services, market regulator and promoter of regional equality' 
(Bottelier 2010: 71). 
The 2008 macro-economic stimulus programme combined loose mon-
etary policies, massive state investments and state-guided increases in 
bank lending. It brought to the fore key structural features of China's 
ﬁnancial system and its growth model. Lower levels of government 
showed signiﬁcant resistance to central policies, as their own incen-
tives were not necessarily aligned with the priorities of the leadership. 
Though the latter has a greater focus on the overall sustainability of 
growth, the former's horizon for the evaluation of policy consequences 
is far shorter. This led to a trade-off between short-term performance at 
the expense of long term sustainability (Bergsten et al 2009; Gordon & 
Li 2011; Green 2013). Research has highlighted the 'frenzied implemen-
tation' of the stimulus programme (Naughton 2009;9 Goodstadt 2014;10 
Wong 2011), which resulted in a too rapid selection of programmes that 
could receive funds during this phase. The banks continued to follow 
policy guidance in their lending decisions, lacking working independ-
ent credit evaluation mechanisms. In addition, repayment risks were 
neglected at the expense of future asset quality risk. The fact that the 
banks were ordered to lend, however, transferred the responsibility 
for future bad loans resulting from this hasty decision-making to the 
government. 
12 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 35(1)•2017
Michiel Haasbroek and Jörn-Carsten Gottwald _________________________________
The credit bulge created its own problems in that it fostered an over-
heating of the property sector and added to the aforementioned problems 
with local government debt for banks. In a famed speech of 2011, CBRC 
Chair Liu Minkang informed his audience about the predicament for the 
Chinese banking sector and the banking regulator: they had a dual role 
to play, both in strengthening their own functioning and in taking their 
role and responsibility in the economic reform of the country. He noted 
the positive developments in the banking sector around cost control, 
income diversiﬁcation (a greater share of fee and commission income) 
and an improvement in risk management causing a sharp reduction in 
NPL. But in the same speech, Liu made provisions for the fact that the 
'software' of the banks still required improvement. Due diligence, client 
selection, adequate product pricing, risk data collection and problem 
solving were areas that would need to improve (Liu Minkang 2011).11 
These shortcomings played a crucial role in the changes in the banking 
sector, which took place in the aftermath of the GFC.
Changes in China's Banking Sector
Both the GFC itself and the policy response of the central government 
changed the institutional environment for China's banking sector. The 
institutional deﬁcits of the Leninist regulatory state and the conse-
quences of the policies of ﬁnancial repression triggered new policies as 
well as bottom-up processes of entrepreneurialism. The GFC pushed 
the Chinese leadership to the centre stage of global crisis management 
and global economic governance reform. While the Chinese leadership 
hesitated and sought to gain time to properly redevelop its policies ac-
cording to the changing global context, there was little doubt that real-
izing a greater role for China in the global economy required ﬁnancial 
liberalization. Financial liberalization is a prerequisite for the establish-
ment of the RMB as a reserve currency, for ﬁnding new markets for 
Chinese brands and products, and for lessening the reliance on an export 
driven growth model. China's biggest banks grew to become some of 
the largest lenders in the world, and in spite of political restrictions set 
by the national government they intensiﬁed their international activi-
ties. At home, the stimulus programme triggered an explosive credit 
growth that led to a shift in lending patterns partly stimulated by the 
rise of shadow ﬁnance, which turned out to exert substantial innovative 
pressures on the banking industry.
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Top-down Internationalization through 'Going Global'
The strategy to 'Go Global' (literally 'Going out-Strategy') was ﬁrst an-
nounced in 2001. It was the logical consequence of the economic reforms 
initiated in the 1970s (Zheng 2006)12 and complemented the Chinese 
attempts towards 'bringing in' foreign investment by urging Chinese 
enterprises to 'go out' (Jiang 2002).13 The GFC presented 'Chinese en-
terprises with a rare opportunity to go global,' as the People's Daily14 
noted, citing a divergence in economic trajectory between a declining 
US economy and a thriving Chinese one. 
In 2009, the CBRC reported that '5 large commercial banks have set up 
86 branches or subsidiaries outside of China and acquired or invested 
in 5 foreign banks' with the goal to 'meet the needs of Chinese enter-
prises for cross-border ﬁnancial services' and to 'tap the opportunities 
provided by international ﬁnancial markets' (CBRC 2009: 40).15 Develop-
ment banks had a prominent role in this process, especially the China 
Development Bank's (CDB). The CDB developed new business areas at 
home and abroad by offering new products to China's local authorities 
and by pushing overseas activities of Chinese companies. While a state-
owned policy-bank, it actively sought to change its existing business 
model after the GFC (Walter & Howie 2011). CDB's most prominent 
direct foreign investment in the ﬁnancial services industry has been its 
tie-up with UK's Barclay's bank, linked in 2007 and extended in 2014. 
Starting as a means for strategic cooperation in Africa (Helgren 2014)16 
the cooperation soon extended when CDB sought to beneﬁt from Bar-
clay's experience in the commodities business. CDB invested directly in 
Barclay's and stated that this investment should also help it further in 
their commercialization drive. Together with China Export Import Bank 
(C-EXIM), CDB was initially the most prominent Chinese lender going 
abroad. The two policy banks were complemented by the state-owned 
commercial banks to actively increase their overseas exposures. While 
the move abroad was in line with the central strategy, CDB's domestic 
moves were more controversial and contributed to the drastic rise in 
local authority debt (see below).
The policy banks were followed by a number of Chinese commercial 
banks in the period after the GFC. ICBC acquired or took a stake in the 
US business of the Bank of East Asia, Thai lender ACL, a stake in the 
Argentinian business of Standard Bank, Tekstil Bankasi in Turkey, and 
it set up a branch in Brazil. China Construction Bank also set up in Brazil 
through an acquisition of BicBanco and further increased its international 
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footprint by investing in Russian VTB following the creation of a Russian 
subsidiary. Notably, it was not just the state-owned commercial banks 
that invested outside of China. Bank of Communications invested in 
Brazilian lender Banco BBM in a deal that was announced following a 
high-proﬁle trip of Premier Li Keqiang to Latin America.17 
In sum, while the Go Global strategy was coined before the GFC, both 
the improved opportunities for doing business abroad and the need to 
support industrial corporations facilitated more international activities 
by Chinese banks. While state guidance and direct involvement played 
a substantial role, increased international presence adds further pressure 
on the leadership to continue and intensify reforms. A growing number 
of Chinese banks accused of money laundering face legal proceedings, 
pushing the state to speed up the process of legislative and regulatory 
reform at home (PBOC 2015a). 
The intensiﬁcation of the strategy would also play into concrete 
measures to internationalize the Chinese currency. The gradual estab-
lishment of the RMB as an international currency thus reﬂects both a 
market-driven process and an explicit policy objective of the Chinese 
leadership (Eichengreen & Kawai 2014: 5). China's policy response to 
the crisis created the opportunity to internationalize the RMB, which, 
in turn, increased pressure on China to continue reform and opening 
up, particularly in its ﬁnancial system (Xinhua 2016).18
Top-down Credit Growth and Shifts in Lending 
Behaviour 
With the implementation of the stimulus programme came a marked 
shift in banks' lending behaviour. One of the main points of criticism 
about the weak economic role that banks play in the Chinese economy is 
that they have a lending bias. Difﬁculty in obtaining formal ﬁnancing has 
been identiﬁed as a great obstacle to the development of smaller private 
enterprises. Nee and Opper describe the fundamental lending bias of 
Chinese banks, stating that at the outset of the GFC, 'it is commonplace 
for even established medium and large sized private ﬁrms to be denied 
access to credit from commercial banks' (2012: 97). Since the 1980s and 
1990s, banks have allocated credit to more of the proﬁtable SOEs than 
did the government. These were more likely to be given to SOEs that 
adopted reforms, which acted as signals of good performance. Later in 
the 1990s, the link between bank loans and enterprise proﬁtability grew 
weaker as the government shifted bail-out responsibilities to banks' (Cull 
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& Xu 2003: 534). Chinese banks started to bear greater responsibility for 
the performance of their creditors, yet the piling up of NPL demonstrates 
that banks were not able to handle this responsibility. 
A lack of proﬁt incentives on the side of banks due to prevalent state 
ownership, project selection being subject to informal and network-
based procedures, as selection of 'bankable projects' was subject to col-
lateral requirements, as well as personal relations, all contributed to these 
difﬁculties (Gregory & Tenev 2001).19 On the side of the companies, the 
relative opacity of private ﬁrms is seen as the main reason why compa-
nies ﬁnd it harder to obtain credit. A wave of commercialization efforts 
later, Hale and Long (2010) still found that SOEs have easier access to 
formal credit and to trade credit. As a consequence of the constraints 
for bank lending shadow banking grew in signiﬁcance. Hale and Long 
observed that:
Chinese private ﬁrms have resorted to a variety of mechanisms […] these 
mechanisms include a greater reliance on retained earnings (via lower tax rate 
and higher proﬁt rate), a ﬂexible yet reasonably efﬁcient usage of informal 
ﬁnances, and very efﬁcient management of working capital. (2010: 14)
This situation changed with the GFC. In the period from 2009 to 2012, 
the share of bank loans to private enterprises rose from 26 per cent to 
52 per cent amidst an unusually sharp growth in credit (Borst & Lardy 
2015)20 indicating an increasing commercial orientation by Chinese 
banks.21 Noting the reliance of privately owned companies on informal 
ﬁnancing, the rise of shadow banking may well have helped to chan-
nel ﬁnancial funds to more dynamic SMEs, laying a foundation for a 
more broad-based economic development that relies to a lesser extent 
on ﬁxed asset investment. Lardy notes that the number of private en-
terprises grew between 2008 and 2012 from 6.6 million to 10.9 million. 
These companies were also better able to secure bank loans: their share 
in total loans climbed from 13.04 per cent to 16.37 per cent according to 
ofﬁcial PBOC statistics (PBOC 2015a). The lending data includes only 
ofﬁcial bank lending, and given the simultaneous emergence of informal 
lending or lending that may not be accurately reﬂected in the statistics, 
it is reasonable to assume that this period indeed witnessed a growth of 
the private sector, supported by improved credit access for the private 
sector. The composition of leverage underwent a similar change after 
the crisis. Leverage has gone up in certain sectors, but has come down 
since the GFC for private enterprises. The highest leverage post-GFC is 
seen with real estate and construction ﬁrms. Similarly, where borrowing 
costs were higher for private enterprises before the GFC (as compared to 
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SOEs), this difference vanished after the crisis. The study did, however, 
ﬁnd that borrowing costs for construction and real estate companies 
declined, whether privately owned or SOEs (Chivakul & Lam 2015). 
By 2015, as much as 45 per cent of Chinese debt was related to real 
estate. This data further supports the assertion that the traditional 
lending bias is changing; there is less ownership-based bias, and more 
industry bias. Retained earnings remains an important source of ﬁnanc-
ing for the private sector, even though it manages to increasingly secure 
formal ﬁnancing from the commercial banks. However, real estate and 
construction are the sectors that remain credit-hungry, and the banks 
remain willing to lend to these industries, perhaps also because of 
their pivotal importance for the broader economy, and in light of the 
commitment of authorities to ensure an orderly winding down of the 
property boom. 
In sum, the lending behaviour of the banking sector changed after the 
GFC. First, it displayed improved credit access for private companies; 
at the same time, there was a strong sectoral bias in lending – construc-
tion and real estate – that fuelled a boom in investment and property 
construction. The share of formal credit, however, does still not reﬂect 
the size and especially the contribution to overall proﬁts of the private 
sector to China's economy. Though improvements can be witnessed on 
an incremental scale, evidence for a lending bias still exists. In response 
to this the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in 2013 made the 
case for increased reform in the ﬁnancial sector, giving more room for 
privately-owned banks to foster healthy competition. Yet implemen-
tation of these policies started slowly, leading to ten private banking 
licenses being initially handed out by the CBRC in 2014 and the transi-
tion to a normal licensing system that awarded a total of 17 licenses 
until 2017 (CBRC 2017).22 Yet the real institutional changes happened 
outside the regulatory framework.
Bottom-up Changes: The Rise of Shadow Banking 
With the ofﬁcial ﬁnancial system under tight state control and the policy 
of ﬁnancial repression ﬁrmly in place, investors, local authorities and 
private savers alike intensiﬁed their search for alternative products and 
services. Shadow banking activities have expanded greatly during the 
ﬁrst years of implementation of the stimulus programme between 2008-
2010. Standard & Poor's estimated in 2013 that the size of China's shadow 
banking came out at RMB 22.9 trillion (USD 3.7 trillion), equivalent to 
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34 per cent of total loans and 44 per cent of the PRC's 2012 GDP. This 
stands in stark contrast for instance to the G20 and Eurozone countries, 
where shadow banking is estimated to total 111 per cent of 2011 GDP. 
Thus it is not so much the size of China's shadow banking sector, but 
its rampant growth that causes concern. However, some other sources 
put the Chinese ﬁgure at around the size of GDP (Wei et al. 2014).23 By 
2017, shadow banking is estimated to have reached USD 8.5 trillion, ac-
counting for nearly 16 per cent of corporate ﬁnance in China (Bloomberg 
2017).24 It is also not just the size of exposure, but also the growth rate 
and composition, that are potential sources of problems. It is critical to 
note that it had the potential to destabilize a core component of the bank-
ing system, i.e. the stickiness of client deposits, as these deposits could 
now be mobilised in a search for greater yield. The main products that 
make up shadow banking are wealth management products, trust and 
entrusted loans, and underground ﬁnancing or banking, which is the 
practice engaged in by loan sharks, pawn shops, and informal lenders 
outside of the regulated banking sector. Charlene Chu, an analyst of 
Fitch Ratings gained substantial fame by underlining the liquidity risk 
that this posed, as short-term WMP were used to fund long-term loan 
commitments.25 This triggered in a spike in interbank activity, especially 
in June 2013 when the PBOC engineered a sharp signal to banks that 
they were walking a very tight rope. Because of their better position 
in obtaining client deposits, the large State-Owned Commercial Banks 
were large net lenders in the interbank market.26 
The authorities started to use the measure of total social ﬁnancing to 
differentiate between credit extended by banks and other sources of debt 
ﬁnancing. The gap between the two measures started to grow sharply 
after 2010, in evidence that alternative ﬁnancing sources started to make 
up a growing percentage of ﬁnancing for companies that could not be 
met by the banks by means of traditional lending.
At the same time, the bigger part of shadow banking has served 
the credit expansion to sectors of which the regulators sought to limit 
indebtedness. The demand for alternative venues to obtain credit in-
cluded local governments who used non-banking sources for 43 per cent 
of their debts of 17.9trn RMB (June 2013) with 11 per cent by shadow 
banks, according to the China National Audit Ofﬁce (Wei et al. 2014).  
Stricter reserve requirements and interest rate controls invited both pub-
lic and private actors to seek innovative products outside the established 
system. Thus, commercial banks as well as local government entities and 
state-controlled corporations – all of them with relatively easy access to 
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TABLE 1: Total Social Financing and RMB Credits
Source: Reuters, EIKON
the formal funding – expanded their shadow banking activities in the 
context of the stimulus program. Banks, due to the strict regulation on 
the loan to deposit ratio, discovered in it a means to increase lending by 
putting the exposures off balance sheet, satisfying, by means of WMP, 
the demand of savers for higher yields. China Development Bank played 
a crucial role in developing these alternative models of local funding 
later copied by more Chinese banks (Walter and Howie 2011). Further-
more, state-controlled enterprises and local state entities have utilized 
their facilitated access to formal credit to provide loan guarantees for 
private businesses and real estate developers. These guarantees were 
in turn collateralized as wealth-management products.
Banks also developed innovative ways to work around regulation, 
hiding their exposure by cooperating with specialized vehicles or ac-
counting for risky debt as investments. China's mid-tier banks in par-
ticular turned increasingly towards 'complex instruments to make new 
loans and restructure existing loans that are then shown as low-risk 
investments on their balance sheets, masking the scale and risks of their 
lending to China's slowing economy' (Zhang & Miller 2016).27 Even after 
trade in some of the products was banned from the banks balance sheets 
in 2014, they soon reappeared under a different heading, thus indicat-
ing the ongoing race between the industry and the regulators. Banks 
even started to operate as trustees in lending between non-ﬁnancial 
ﬁrms and ﬁnancial ﬁrms. These 'entrusted loans' played a crucial part 
in offsetting the impact of the decline in ofﬁcial bank lending and in 
the rise of shadow banking (Chen et al. 2016) and meeting the demand 
of borrowers for liquidity due to persistent mismatches between short-
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term borrowing and long-term repayment capacity (Moody's 2013).  This 
dual assessment − that on the one hand, shadow banking met legitimate 
borrowing needs, but on the other hand posed a systemic risk − was 
recognized in a Circular regarding the Regulation of Shadow Banking 
(Guowuyuan 2013),28 which lay out the premises for the tightening of 
regulation in 2014, making the effort to rein in and gain control a chal-
lenging balancing act.
The growth in shadow ﬁnance raised the alarm in Beijing and thus 
necessitated a multi-faceted response, combining efforts to address 
the funding needs of local authorities with regulatory innovations to 
increase the oversight of non-bank ﬁnancial institutions. The emer-
gence of shadow banking therefore highlights the growing competitive 
pressures on China's banking industry outside the traditional market 
framework and the increasing acceptance of new providers of banking 
services by the PRC's leadership. As Chen et al. (2016) suggest, this can 
not be explained solely by the fact that the state-owned banks under 
Central Huijin are under more direct state-control and thus stricter in 
following regulatory guidance. Indeed, ﬁnancial innovation was not 
necessarily seen as negative by the highest state ofﬁcials: Premier Li 
Keqiang (2015: 4)29 identiﬁed innovation and entrepreneurialism as key 
drivers for future growth; and shadow ﬁnance generated both entrepre-
neurialism and innovation by, among other things, linking e-commerce 
with ﬁnancial services.
As the previous discussion has already indicated, the expansion of 
shadow banking activities has, on the one hand, created new ﬁnan-
cialized uses of capital predominantly for the capital-intensive state-
controlled sector and, on the other hand, has created new ﬁnancial 
sources for the labour-intensive private sector. While the private sector 
is notoriously underbanked, the state controlled sector is now lending 
to the private sector outside the regulated commercial banking sector. 
What is more, shadow banking further facilitated the rise of internet 
ﬁnance, which has given unprecedented stimulus to changes in the 
banking sector.
Bottom-up Innovation: The Rise of Internet Finance
Internet ﬁnance in China experienced an enormous, even wild, devel-
opment highlighting numerous regulatory shortcomings and conﬂicts 
(Zheng 2016).30 A case in point is internet-based P2P (peer-to-peer) 
lending (Tsai 2015: 70-72). Early concerns regarding the risk of the P2P 
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development in China31 were substantiated in 2016 when 21 people 
were detained over the breakdown of the Ezubo platform in 2016.32 The 
total number of P2P-ﬁrms was estimated at 3800 with an annual capital 
volume of around US$ 21bn (Su 2016)33 before the government de facto 
imposed a freeze on the establishment of new ones in April 2016 (Wu 
2016).34 While P2P-lending propelled innovation and growth, it created 
substantial political and social risks much to the concern of Chinese 
authorities. With more than 1200 P2P lending platforms in trouble or 
suspected of cheating (Su 2016) the authorities feared the loss of 'hun-
dreds of billions of yuan from retail investors'. 
China provided a very speciﬁc soil for the growth of internet ﬁnance: 
while Big Data has become a global mega-trend including the PRC, 
ﬁnancial repression led to a mismatch between demand and supply in 
China's ﬁnancial sector. Particularly 'demand for ﬁnancial services of 
ordinary people and many small and medium-sized companies has still 
not been met'.35  Second, the use of smartphones and online platforms 
is extremely popular in China with more than 600 million smart-phone 
users and more than 200 million users of WeChat and Sina Weibo; and 
the size of the country and its population is a huge incentive to develop 
ﬁnancial services that 'will no longer be subject to the restraints of time 
and space' (Huang 2015). Thus, internet ﬁnance offers the promise of 
inclusive ﬁnance for all kinds of customers and investors (Ping et al. 
2016: 6).
This sudden rise of internet ﬁnance in China was driven by two major 
developments: successful e-commerce triggered a move of online-trad-
ers into ﬁnancial services while at the same time traditional ﬁnancial 
services providers increased their online business (Takeshi 2014: 1). 
For example, internet trading giant Alibaba allowed users of AliPay to 
invest money left on their accounts into money market funds offered 
by Yu E Bao, thus offering private wealth products outside the tradi-
tional banking sector. Those investments were then channelled into an 
investment fund, which soon grew to become the largest such fund in 
China reaching 250bn RMB in January 2014.  In 2015, Alibaba extended 
its online ﬁnancial activities and established Mybank. 
Following Alibaba's success, numerous companies of different sectors 
– internet, communication, insurance – created similar and linked offers. 
In 2015, China's gaming and social network giant Tencent Holdings 
launched the PRC's ﬁrst online-only bank, We Bank.36 Prime Minister 
Li Keqiang attended the opening of We Bank and emphasized the role 
of these new internet banks in providing credit to small and medium 
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size enterprises. While internet ﬁnance was seen as generally positive, 
the leadership also emphasized the need to control internet activity and 
reminded the companies of their responsibility to prevent the spread 
of incorrect information and activities. Internet ﬁnance thus became 
caught between ambitious plans to foster innovation in China and the 
imperative to tighten control of information and public discourse (Dong 
2016; Xing 2016).37 
When the PBOC, together with the CSRC, ﬁnally published guide-
lines for online banking services in June 2015, P2P lending in China 
had already grown into the largest P2P-market in the world. For the 
month of May 2015, P2P-lending was estimated to have reached USD 
10bn. Regulators were pushed hard to ﬁnd a balance between support-
ing Premier Li Keqiang's internet plus strategy and getting their hands 
on stock market speculation, further fuelled by funds borrowed online 
via China's booming internet platforms. The guidelines published by 
the PBOC contained both policy measures to encourage innovation 
and regulatory propositions to establish effective supervision. A set of 
restrictive regulations was announced in the beginning of 2016, offering 
much-awaited rules for the surging sector.38 These rules allowed money 
market funds among other to invest in negotiable certiﬁcates of deposits 
and corporate bonds. The authorities faced an important dilemma in 
how to approach regulating the new investment opportunities. Follow-
ing the correction in the stock market that occurred in mid-2015, and 
an environment where authorities attempt to stem outﬂows of money 
from the country to support the USD/RMB exchange rate, another 
source for higher yield that keeps investors' money in the country was 
extremely welcome. 
The political difﬁculties in deﬁning the ofﬁcial policy for the regulation 
of internet ﬁnance can easily be deducted from the number of organiza-
tions involved: the People's Bank of China, the Ministry of Industry and 
Information, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Finance, 
the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, the Legislative 
Affairs Ofﬁce, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission and the State Internet Information Ofﬁce (Wood & Wang 
2015).39 Regulatory principles needed to be deﬁned as well as regulatory 
responsibilities to allow for dynamic development while containing so-
cial and political risks (PBOC 2015b: 2).40 Finally, the authorities ordered 
the establishment of a self-regulatory body, the National Internet Finance 
Association of China (Zhongguo hulianwang Jinrong Xiehui) in Shanghai, 
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and the formations of regulatory teams to deal with high-proﬁle cases 
of internet ﬁnance fraud in the main municipalities (Wu et al. 2016).41 
Most of the big banks had ﬁrst sought to block the rise of internet 
ﬁnance, but some, like Minsheng Bank, early on cooperated with Ali-
baba's online ﬁnancial services. In a reaction to the growing popularity, 
the PRC's biggest banks announced free mobile transfers up to 5000 
RMB. They followed the example of China Merchants Bank and other 
regional banks that had taken the same step in 2015. The 'Big 5' banks 
followed a rule from the PBOC, which had 'issued a notice in December 
requesting ﬁnancial institutions to scrap online and mobile transfer fees 
following the surge in growth of internet payments services such as 
Alibaba-backed Alipay and Tencent's WeChat Pay.42 While Alipay kept 
its free transfer policy, Tencent announced plans to introduce a small 
fee for mobile transfers to private accounts in order to cover its own 
costs indicating that the big online companies had cross-subsidized the 
introduction of internet ﬁnancial services beforehand.
In sum, the reaction of China's traditional banks to their new competi-
tors entailed a combination of trying to stymy their growth by lobbying 
the central government to create mechanisms of control and regulation 
while at the same joining key players in their business development. The 
emergence of new and innovative competitors has already started to 
change the business sectors. The new competitive pressures in China's 
banks promise to push for some long-awaited changes in governance, 
management and products. Thus one of the key factors pushing for 
change in the PRC's banking sector emerged outside of both the ofﬁcial 
policy and the ofﬁcial regulatory framework.
Conclusion
When the GFC hit the PRC, the country's tightly controlled ﬁnancial 
system looked healthy and resilient. With the credit binge following 
the macro-economic stimulus programme of 2008, China's banking sec-
tor suddenly found itself in the middle of a profound transformation: 
seeking to strengthen its presence abroad, it suddenly faced strong, 
new and widely unregulated competition from shadow ﬁnance. On 
the one hand, this met the demand of savers for more yield and satis-
ﬁed underserved borrowers' demand for credit helping to ﬁnance the 
economic restructuring away from an export model, but it posed an 
increasing systemic risk to which the regulatory institutions were not 
necessarily equipped, both in organization and tools, to answer. With 
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patterns of lending shifting and internet ﬁnance driving innovation, the 
banks needed to react. One key element of their reaction has been their 
continued lobbying for political protection. With the regulation of April 
2016 following cases of massive fraud, internet ﬁnance is undergoing 
a period of scrutiny and supervision. Yet by introducing new regula-
tions, the Chinese authorities have publicly acknowledged the positive 
contribution of new ﬁnancial competition and their signiﬁcance for the 
Chinese economy. The traditional lenders enjoyed an easy environment 
as a result of regulated interest rates, making as much as US$ 228 billion 
in net proﬁt in the record year 2013 (Bloomberg 2013) and the rise in 
WMPs certainly added to their increased share of fee-based income.43
China's banking industry is quickly changing. Though banks have 
been instructed to increase lending to SMEs (not necessarily privately 
owned) and private ﬁrms, they ﬁnd it hard to adjust and look for ways 
to continue lending to their more traditional borrowers: state-owned 
companies, real estate developers and local governments (Sweeney & 
Wildau 2013),44 but often try to conceal these exposures, making the 
ﬂow of funds more opaque and thus making it harder for the regula-
tors to keep track of systemic risk building up. As more opportunities 
unfold for investors to get higher yields on a range of ﬁnancial products, 
banks will likely see their deposit bases erode and competition for sav-
ings intensify. There are two cases in point: the emergence of shadow 
banking and the rise of money market funds. 
The new ﬁnancing and investment opportunities broadly support 
an active policy that seeks a greater role of SMEs and private ﬁrms, 
moving away from manufacturing for export, but rather supporting a 
more dynamic and innovative domestic economy that relies more on 
domestic consumption rather than investment. This has had the result 
that regulators do not necessarily step in to choke off new investment 
opportunities, although they do remain vigilant about the systemic 
risk. The regulators will have to balance complex considerations, such 
as supporting the economic restructuring, keeping a watchful eye on 
the micro-prudential environment (not weakening the existing banks 
too much) and ensuring a redirection of investment funds in a way that 
does not endanger ﬁnancial stability.
They have also clariﬁed that the speed with which the necessary 
reforms will be enacted will depend on a favourable macro-economic 
environment. Of equal importance is the need to strengthen intra-agency 
coordination between the various regulators to avoid a build-up of sys-
temic risk resulting from increased inter-linkages between the various 
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sectors in the ﬁnancial sector: insurance, trust companies, banks, and 
challengers such as internet funds are increasingly connected due to 
ﬁnancial innovation as outlined in this paper. This increases systemic 
risk, but the regulators are still organized in sectoral silos (though there 
are persistent rumours that this will change in the very near future).
The response to the GFC, in the form of a massive and only partly 
planned stimulus, created its own problems. Firstly, local governments 
increased land sales, largely to property developers, who in turn started 
a building spree that many say is featured by an inefﬁcient distribution: 
ghost towns in some places, bubbles in others. Secondly, the profession-
alization of banks was reversed45 and may have helped in spurring the 
tremendous surge in shadow banking. In addition, this response took 
place in the context of an environment of unﬁnished banking reforms, 
which has led to a steady build-up of ﬁnancial vulnerabilities. The 
saturation of the domestic credit market has sped up the Go Global 
strategy of Chinese enterprises, and has also proven to be an impetus 
to an outward opening of China's ﬁnancial sector: the project of RMB 
internationalization, relying on a phased opening of the capital account 
and a market-determined exchange rate are now being pursued with 
more vigour than ever before. This means however, that the Chinese 
economy has become more important as a potential source of risk to 
the rest of the world, while the developments also rattled the balance 
of power between the regulators of the ﬁnancial sector. 
The absence of clear and comprehensive government policies on 
developments in the ﬁnancial sector created a vacuum that was being 
ﬁlled in an entrepreneurial fashion by market participants. This puts 
the regulators on the defensive and, where it concerns cross-mandate is-
sues, leads to intense debate about the responsibilities of each individual 
regulatory institution. But the race between entrepreneurial innovators 
and regulators is set to continue, and it promises a dynamic institutional 
framework for China's banking industry.
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